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A Growing Consensus: State Sponsorship of 
Confederate Symbols is an Injury-in-Fact as a 
Result of Dylann Roof’s Killing Blacks in 
Church at a Bible Study 
 
L. Darnell Weeden ⃰ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The current debates over Confederate symbols were 
ignited by Dylann Roof’s murder of nine black churchgoers in 
Charleston, S.C. in 2015. The racially motivated killings 
produced new opposition to Confederate icons in public 
spaces.”1 As New Orleans officials eliminated the statue of 
Louisiana native son and Confederate General P.G.T. 
Beauregard on May 17, 2017, they provided an example of how 
to start the process of making right the national shame of 
honoring people who led the battle to protect Southern 
slavery.2 “No matter how artfully apologists attempt to 
promote a romanticized Southern heritage, the Confederacy 
waged war on the United States primarily for the preservation 
of slavery.”3 Regarding the implication of Confederate symbols, 
such as the Confederate flag and monuments honoring Civil 
 
� Roberson King Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern 
University; B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. I give a particular expression of gratitude to my 
wife and children for their forbearance as I developed this article. The author would like to 
thank my colleague, Associate Professor Shaundra K. Lewis, for her valuable feedback, and 
Daniel Caldwell, Thurgood Marshall School of Law Class of 2019, for his assistance. 
 1.  Logan Strother et al, The Confederate Flag Largely Disappeared After the Civil 
War, WASHINGTON POST, June 12, 2017, 2017 WLNR 18023240. 
 2.  Yohuru Williams, Confederate Symbols, Statues Whitewash Shameful History, 
THE BULLETIN (Norwich, Conn.), May 31, 2017 at A7, 2017 WLNR 16865869. 
 3.  Id. 
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War generals, the battle has gone on for decades.4 However, 
the murder of black parishioners in June of 2015 at the 
Emanuel A.M.E. Church caused the issue to surge in the 
regular news media.5 “The Confederate flag, monuments and 
memorials are not harmless remembrances of an honorable 
war, but of our deepest shame as a nation. They are symbols of 
hate, representative of an inglorious past built on the immoral 
underpinnings of racial slavery.”6 
Karl Oliver, a member of the Mississippi House of 
Representatives, is an unabashed, enthusiastic endorser of all 
Confederate symbols.7 Oliver clearly disagrees with those who 
want confederate symbols to be removed from taxpayer 
sponsored parks and public spaces.8 Unlike Oliver, some people 
would limit the display of Confederate symbols honoring the 
lost cause to private forums by private owners.9 Representative 
Oliver, according to one commentator, “has managed to make 
himself a national embarrassment by calling for the lynching of 
elected officials in New Orleans for removing Confederate 
symbols — including a 20-foot tall statue of Civil War Gen. 
Robert E. Lee.”10 However, Oliver does not appear to be as 
dangerous as Roof, who wrapped himself in symbols of the 
Confederacy prior to executing nine African-American 
worshippers in church in South Carolina in 2015.11 “Roof’s 
murderous rampage started a renewed effort to get rid 
of Confederate symbols from public spaces. Hopefully Oliver’s 
 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id.. 
 7.  See Otis Sanford, Opinion, Lynching Comment National Disgrace, CLARION-
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 28, 2017, at C4, 2017 WLNR 16534184 (Sanford holds the 
Hardin Chair of Excellence in Journalism and Strategic Media at the University of Memphis). 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  See id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
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dangerous and asinine comments will help complete the push, 
once and for all.”12 
The process of removing four Confederate statutes in 
New Orleans, including one of General Robert E. Lee, began 
two years ago after the gunman, Roof, struggled to promote a 
do-it-yourself ‘race war’ by murdering nine individuals during a 
Bible study at a historic Charleston, S.C. church.13 Many cities 
do not have the courage to follow the City of New Orleans’s 
example regarding the proper treatment of the public display of 
Confederate symbols in a public forum by public officials.14 A 
rational case for engaging in a public debate about whether the 
public display of southern Confederate symbols represents 
sound or poor public policy is both necessary and proper.15 
“And shame on us if it takes another atrocity for the discussion 
to start. Our past is meaningless if we don’t use it to find a path 
to a better future.”16 
Biloxi, Mississippi is now directly involved in a current 
southern clash regarding Confederate symbols after its 
Republican Mayor, Andrew “FoFo” Gilich, mandated in April 
2017 that the Mississippi State flag be removed from city 
buildings.17 Mississippi is the last state flag in America to 
display the Confederate battle symbol.18 The Mississippi flag 
became subject to passionate analysis after the self-proclaimed 
white supremacist Roof slew nine black participants at a Bible 
Study in a church in June of 2015.19 It is now well known that 
Roof posed for pictures while embracing and possessing the 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13. Editorial, Don’t Wait for Another Hate-Warped Gun Rampage to Force Action on 
Confederate Memorials, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 25, 2017, 2017 WLNR 16249697. 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Emily Pettus, ‘Fly The Flag’? Rift in Mississippi over Confederate Symbol, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 2017, 2017 WLNR 16066908. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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rebel Confederate flag.20 “Instead of waiting for a top-down 
decision, many cities and counties and all eight public 
universities [in Mississippi] have acted on their own to remove 
the flag from display since 2015.”21 Biloxi Mayor Gilich had the 
Mississippi flag removed from city buildings during April of 
2017 because he thinks the Confederate symbol causes people 
to sense that they are not welcome.22 “Hospitality is important 
in Biloxi, a diverse city that is home to an Air Force base and 
has an economy heavily dependent on tourists who gamble in 
casinos and sunbathe on white-sand beaches,”23 so a pragmatic 
Mayor Gilich’s goal is to make sure that everybody feels 
welcome in Biloxi.24 
Contrary to the modern trend in the courts,25 any individual 
living in Mississippi has traditional standing under common law 
to challenge Mississippi’s state flag on equal protection grounds 
as a public injury.26 The state’s display of the flag at state-
sponsored activities and on state properties constitutes 
government hate speech endorsing racial prejudice since the 
Confederate flag, a racist Confederate symbol, represents 
slavery, racial animus, and inequality. Part II highlights the 
ongoing debate about how society should treat the problematic 
historic legacy of the Confederacy. Part II of this article 
emphasizes that denying state governments the ability to 
sponsor Confederate symbols is necessary. This denial is 
necessary since these symbols honor the supporters of slavery; 
Southern history shows a direct connection to the Confederacy 
and slavery. As a rule in the litigated cases generally, plaintiffs 
 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See Pettus, supra note 17. 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169–70 (1992) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 
(1970)). 
 26.  See id. at 167. 
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challenging state-sponsored use of Confederate symbols have 
not been successful because courts have misunderstood the 
nature of their public Article III injuries.27 “There is no 
evidence of constitutional limits on the power to grant 
standing. In both England and America, actions by strangers, or 
by citizens in general, were fully permissible and indeed 
familiar. There is no basis for the view that . . . English and . . . 
American conception of adjudication forbade suits by . . . 
citizens.”28 Part III reveals the injury-in-fact was not a historical 
requirement to establish a violation of a private right: Since 
Article III standing may apply to either public or private 
injuries, a private injury-in-fact is unnecessary to guarantee the 
separation of powers under an Article III theory.29 Part IV 
makes the claim that the Mississippi flag, with its incorporated 
Confederate symbol, violates the Constitution because the 
state’s use of its flag allows a reasonable observer to believe the 
Mississippi flag represents government speech endorsing racial 
subordination in violation of the principle of equal protection. 
Mississippi’s sponsorship of a Confederate symbol in its flag 
constitutes invidious government speech under the equal 
protection clause because racial history matters. Mississippi’s 
long-standing, racially-tainted political process prohibits 
African Americans, a racial minority in the state, from using the 
normal political process as a tool to remove the Confederate 
flag symbol, a form of symbolic government speech, from the 
state’s flag. Part V makes the case that Mississippi’s public 
universities are plausible successful plaintiffs to challenge 
Mississippi’s sponsorship of a Confederate symbol in its official 
flag under the controversial conventional standing rules. In 
conclusion, Part V maintains that the judges in the Confederate 
 
 27. Id. at 167. 
 28.  Id. at 171. 
 29. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
275, 299 (2008) (citations omitted). 
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flag cases who have blindly followed the personal injury-in-fact 
requirement of standing have in fact denied deserving plaintiffs, 
who are descendants of slaves, relief from state sponsorship of 
odious discriminatory Confederate government speech, which 
sends a message of white supremacy.  
 
 
II.  AN ONGOING DEBATE ABOUT HOW SOCIETY 
SHOULD TREAT THE HISTORIC PROBLEMATIC 
LEGACY OF THE CONFEDERACY 
 
A simple but profound question regarding the public 
display of Confederate symbols has challenged towns, counties, 
and states throughout the South over many years: “What place 
do symbols honoring a failed rebellion, one that fought for the 
right to subjugate people, have in a modern society?”30 In May 
2017, after another expanded Rebel flag fight in Henry County, 
Georgia, Jason Pye, a politically active libertarian who has a 
Rebel ancestor, has rather insightfully answered the 
Confederate symbols question by advising his southern friends 
and family to remember: “It’s over. The South lost; let it go. . . 
. Until people accept that, people will continue to spend money 
to honor slavery.”31 
“Confederate symbols do not appeal directly to racial 
animus. Still, the politics of Confederate symbols have not 
changed completely: In surveys of whites, racial animus 
correlates strongly with support for Confederate symbols. 
Opponents of these symbols continue to make the connection 
to race.”32 
 
 
 30.  Bill Torpy, Opinion, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Torpy at Large column, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., May 30, 2017, 2017 WLNR 16699122. 
 31.  Id. (quoting Jason Pye, a politically active libertarian). 
 32.  Strother et al., supra note 1. 
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A. Confederate Flags and Monuments as Honoring Slavery 
 
There is a Southern divide on the treatment of 
Confederate symbols. For example, Brandenburg, Kentucky, 
located about 40 miles southwest of Louisville, gladly accepted 
on Monday, May 29, 2017, Memorial Day, a monument 
honoring Confederate soldiers, after the University of 
Louisville removed the same monument as an unwanted 
symbol of slavery.33 After protests and because of student and 
faculty disapproval, in April of 2016 the University of Louisville 
declared that it would remove the monument, which had been 
established in 1895.34 
The debate regarding removing a Confederate statue 
from the property outside of the Hillsborough County 
Courthouse is unquestionably long overdue and should be 
quickly resolved in favor of removal because, “How can a 
government purporting to represent every citizen salute those 
who fought to deny equality to every citizen?”35 It is a valid 
assertion to contend a person looking for justice in a 
courthouse should not be required implicitly to acknowledge a 
symbol of racial injustice.36 Regardless of the historically 
sanitized discussion, “the Confederate Constitution clearly 
indicates that if the Confederacy had won, it would have 
continued slavery in the South and possibly extended it to new 
territories.”37 
Controversies regarding the removal of public 
Confederate monuments in New Orleans and Charlottesville, 
Virginia simply highlight an ongoing debate about how society 
 
 33.  Bryan Woolston, Kentucky Town Welcomes Confederate Monument, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., May 30, 2017, at 11, 2017 WLNR 16689406. 
 34.  Kentucky Town Rededicates Confederate Memorial Moved from Louisville, WASH. 
POST (Wash., D.C.), May 30, 2017, at A02, 2017 WLNR 16684871. 
 35.  Ernest Hooper, Battle Goes Beyond Removing Confederate Symbols, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (FL), May 29, 2017, at 1, 2017 WLNR 16630992. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
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should treat the historic legacy of the Confederacy.38 Ilya 
Somin agrees with conservative columnist Jeff Jacoby, 
libertarian Ronald Bailey, and others who believe that the 
government should remove Southern Confederate symbols 
when they are intended to honor the supporters of the legacy of 
slavery.39 According to Somin, the Confederate symbols issue 
has evolved to this uncomplicated plan: “the government 
should not honor people whose principal claim to fame is that 
they fought a bloody war in defense of the evil institution of 
slavery.”40 Ultimately, Somin argues that both Confederate 
monuments and the Confederate flag should disappear from 
public spaces of honor because the main goal of the 
Confederates during the secession from the United States was 
to preserve the enslavement of African Americans.41 
Mississippi’s official justification for its secession clearly 
indicated a very close link between secession and maintaining 
the institution of slavery.42 Mississippi argued that because 
products produced by slave labor had “become necessities of 
the world, and a blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and 
civilization. That blow has been long aimed at the institution . . 
. and . . . reaching its consummation. There was no choice left 
us but submission to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution 
of the Union.”43 
 
 
 
 
 
 38.  Ilya Somin, The Case for Taking Down Confederate Monuments, WASH. POST, 
May 17, 2017, 2017 WLNR 15340103. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. (quoting Mississippi’s official statement outlining its reason for secession). 
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B. Southern History Shows a Direct Connection to the 
Confederacy and Slavery 
 
Supporters of the Confederate flag often attempt to 
deny that it represents their Southern heritage of slavery.44 
Reginald Hildebrand, a professor emeritus of history at the 
University of North Carolina, concedes it is conceivable the 
Civil War involved more than one issue, although “it would be 
hard to argue slavery was not the key issue.”45 On this issue, 
Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens delivered the 
Cornerstone Speech in Savannah, Georgia, just prior to the 
Confederacy setting off shots at Ft. Sumter which started the 
Civil War.46 “Our new government is founded upon exactly 
[this] idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon 
the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; 
that slavery subordination to the superior race, is his natural 
and normal condition.”47 University of North Carolina Law 
Professor Al Brophy asserts that regardless of how one feels 
about Southern heritage, a “compelling” case exists for 
removing Confederate symbols from public settings.48 The 
Confed-erate flag in 2017 represents a “symbol of white 
supremacy and that is the message it sends.”49 
The statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee 
became the last of New Orleans’s four confederate monuments 
removed from the public square.50 The removal of Lee’s statue 
marked the end of 130 years of publicly honoring a person who 
 
 44.  Mark Schultz, Chapel Hill Panel Debates Confederate Flag in Schools, HERALD 
SUN (Durham NC), May 21, 2017, at 854, 2017 WLNR 15791043. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. (quoting Reginald Hildebrand).  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. (quoting Al Brophy). 
 50.  Janell Ross, New Orleans Removes Confederacy Monuments, WASH. POST, May 
21, 2017, at A01, 2017 WLNR 15692612. 
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symbolized Southern pride and racial oppression.51 Mayor 
Mitch Landrieu celebrated this historic occasion with an 
inspiring speech in a diplomatic attempt to end almost two 
years of intense discussion in New Orleans regarding the 
historical significance of the monuments.52 “They are not just 
innocent remembrances of a benign history. These monuments 
celebrate a fictional sanitized Confederacy ignoring the death, 
ignoring the enslavement, ignoring the terror that it actually 
stood for.”53 Landrieu said that because Lee and the 
Confederate army fought against the United States, they were 
soldiers who were not patriots.54 
 
C. Plaintiffs’ Challenging State-Sponsored Use of Confederate 
Symbols as a General Rule Have Not Been Successful 
 
Little legitimate precedent is available regarding state-
supported utilization of Confederate symbolic speech, and the 
courts that have judged the issue have generally rejected the 
removal of Confederate flags by strictly construing the First, 
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.55 Plaintiffs have also 
been unsuccessful in having Confederate symbols removed 
from the public square because the courts have misunderstood 
the nature of their public Article III injury.56 Cases that have 
analyzed state sponsorship of the Confederate issue outside of 
the context of school desegregation requirements have rejected 
removal of Confederate flags as mandated by the equal 
protection principle.57 The Eleventh Circuit refused to order 
 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. (quoting New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Kathleen Riley, The Long Shadow of the Confederacy in America’s Schools: State-
Sponsored Use of Confederate Symbols in the Wake of Brown v. Board, 10 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RIGHTS J. 525, 532–534 (2002). 
 56. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 167. 
 57.  Id. 
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the removal of the Confederate flag from atop the Alabama 
capitol building in NAACP v. Hunt.58 In Hunt, the Eleventh 
Circuit rebuffed the NAACP’s claim that a state-sponsored use 
of the Confederate flag violated the Constitution; the court 
decided that the NAACP plaintiffs were not sufficiently 
deprived of the constitutional right of equal protection to 
constitute a recognizable injury thereby.59 
If the premise is true that a racially motivated statute 
may be unconstitutional even if it is facially neutral, then it is 
equally true that since Alabama flew the Confederate flag for 
racially discriminatory reasons, Alabama flying the flag violates 
the equal protection principle.60 Although there was no state 
law mandating the flying of the Confederate flag, Alabama 
raised the flag in 1961 for purposes of honoring the 100th 
anniversary of a Civil War fought to support black 
enslavement.61 “The flag was raised again on the morning of 
April 25, 1963, the day that United States Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy travelled to Montgomery to discuss with 
then-Governor George Wallace the governor’s announced 
intention to block the admission of the first black students to 
the University of Alabama.”62 To reasonable observers 
considering the context in which Alabama raised its pro-
segregation Confederate flag symbol, the state of Alabama 
obviously intended flying the flag atop the capitol dome to 
advance the message that it was playing its race card to appease 
white segregationist at the expense of the right of blacks to the 
equal protection of the law.63 Moreover, there is an unequal 
 
 58.  NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990) (superseded by rule as stated 
in Stadium Book & Video, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 2006 WL 2374740 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 59.  Id. at 1562. 
 60.  Contra Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–32 (1985) (declined to extend by 
Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
 61.  NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1558. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See id. 
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application of the state policy since it should now be common 
knowledge that even if all people of all races are exposed to the 
flag, black people, living in the state because of a history of 
slavery and Jim Crow, are disproportionally injured when 
Alabama flies that flag over its capitol.64 
In Mississippi Division of the United Sons of 
Confederate Veterans v. Mississippi State Conference of 
NAACP Branches, the NAACP unsuccessfully pursued 
declaratory relief and an injunction prohibiting any future 
purchases, displays, maintenance, or expenditures of public 
funds on the Mississippi Flag with its incorporated Confederate 
symbol.65 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the 
NAACP’s argument that the flying of the Mississippi state flag 
violates its members’ constitutional rights to equal protection as 
guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution because the 
NAACP failed to meet the threshold question of constitutional 
injury.66 In Daniels,67 the Mississippi Court decided that the 
flying of a Confederate battle flag by county officials did not 
violate constitutionally protected rights because there is no 
injury under the standing requirement.68 In Moore v. Bryant, 
the plaintiff in a 2016 case unsuccessfully challenged the 
Mississippi state flag because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
an injury-in-fact.69 After following a wrongheaded revisionist 
interpretation of an Article III personal-injury-in-fact standing 
requirement,70 a federal district court held the plaintiff did not 
have standing to challenge the Mississippi flag as 
 
 64.  Id. at 1562. 
 65.  Miss. Div. of United Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Miss. State Conference of 
NAACP Branches, 774 So. 2d 388, 388–89 (Miss. 2000). 
 66.  Id. at 390. 
 67.  Daniels v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 722 So. 2d 136, 139 (Miss. 1998). 
 68.  Miss. Div. of the United Sons of Confederate Veterans, 774 So. 2d at 390. 
 69.  Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 858 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
 70.  Sunstein, supra note 25 at 167. 
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unconstitutional because he did not in fact suffer a recognizable 
personal injury.71 
According to Cass R. Sunstein, the “injury-in-fact” test 
represents a revisionist interpretation of Article III.72 Since the 
injury-in-fact test is without an identifiable constitutional 
source, it appears that the Supreme Court just made up the 
“injury-in-fact” concept.73 Sunstein contends that the Article III 
theory that “the plaintiff must suffer an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and 
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”74 is not 
really mandated by the Constitution.75 
While following the revisionist interpretation of Article 
III,76 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny 
standing to Moore.77 Moore challenged the constitutionality of 
Mississippi flag by articulating an injury-in-fact theory made up 
by the Supreme Court.78 This theory posits that “the 
requirement that a litigant have standing derives from Article 
III of the Constitution.”79 
Under this injury-in-fact theory, the Fifth Circuit 
declared that, at an irreducible constitutional minimum, 
standing required plaintiff Moore to have experienced an 
injury-in-fact which involves “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”80 
The constitutional challenge to the Mississippi flag in 
Moore v. Bryant should have caused the court to recognize that 
 
 71.  Moore, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 834, 858. 
 72.  Sunstein, supra note 25 at 185. 
 73.  Id. at 168 
 74.  Moore, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 850. 
 75.  Sunstein, supra note 25, at 185. 
 76.  Id. at 185–86. 
 77.  Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 78.  Sunstein, supra note 25, at 185. 
 79.  Moore, 853 F.3d at 248. 
 80.  Id. 
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society has developed new standards of civil rights regarding 
state-sponsored use of Confederate symbols,81 and that, under 
the standing rules, the first element of standing is injury-in-fact. 
The federal appeals court disregarded Moore’s claim that he 
suffered injury-in-fact because the Mississippi state flag 
stigmatized him.82 The court rejected Moore’s stigmatic injury 
argument because, according to the court’s revisionist 
interpretation of Article III,83 “stigmatic injury accords a basis 
for standing only to those persons who are personally denied 
equal treatment” by the challenged discriminatory conduct.”84 
It is now time for courts to accept the societal standard 
that state sponsorship of Confederate symbols is a violation of 
the principle of equal protection. It is relatively easy for a court 
to find that state sponsorship of a Confederate flag creates 
invidious racial discrimination where, by adopting “widely 
accepted academic critiques, the Court is flatly wrong to claim 
historical support for a constitutional requirement of standing, 
particularly for the requirement that private parties show some 
sort of individualized injury before they can proceed in federal 
court.”85 Unfortunately, courts have failed to recognize the 
harm produced by Mississippi’s sponsorship of a Confederate 
symbol in its flag because, according to Cass Sunstein, the 
twentieth-century Supreme Court wrongly incorporated “a 
private-law model of standing” into the Constitution.86 
 
 
 81.  See Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834 (S.D. Miss. 2016); See also Kathleen 
Riley, The Long Shadow of the Confederacy in America’s Schools: State-Sponsored Use of 
Confederate Symbols in the Wake Of Brown v. Board, supra note 55 at 531–32. 
 82.  Moore, 853 F.3d at 249. 
 83.  Sunstein, supra note 25 at 185 (internal quotations omitted). 
 84.  Moore, 853 F.3d at 249 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)). 
 85. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 690 (2004). 
 86.  Id. at 691 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433 (1988)). 
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III. PROOF OF THE PRIVATE INJURY-IN-FACT IS NOT A 
HISTORICAL REQUIREMENT UNDER ARTICLE III 
 
This article supports the beliefs that the Constitution, 
under Article III, does not mandate, and history does not 
require, private injury-in-fact for a party to have standing. 
Contemporary standing law requires a private plaintiff suing in 
federal court to prove that she has endured “injury-in-fact,” 
that the injury is legitimately linked to the conduct of the 
defendant, and that a favorable decision from the court can 
remedy the private injury.87 F. Andrew Hessick insists that the 
private injury-in-fact require-ment is unnecessary because 
neither American nor English law practice originally required 
factual harm.88 Historical practice does not support the 
argument that a private injury-in-fact is (or should be) 
mandated by Article III.89 
 
 
A. Article III Standing Should Apply to Public Injuries or 
Private Injuries 
 
From both a historical and contemporary perspective, 
the concept of standing may involve either “public rights” 
(injuries) or “private rights” (injuries).90 Public rights are rights 
possessed by the community at large.91 Public rights include the 
common benefit incurred by general compliance with 
controlling substantive law,92 which may include the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution.93 The consequences for 
 
 87.  Hessick, supra note 29, at 276. 
 88.  Id. at 299. 
 89.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 90.  Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 85, at 693 et seq. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
        93.    Id.  
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violations of public consti-tutional rights “are not measured 
strictly by private loss[.]”94 The proper role of standing is not 
solely to compensate individuals for their private losses but also 
to provide a forum for members of the community to vindicate 
claims that the law of the land was broken.95 Private rights, 
however, are those possessed by a distinct person,96 and 
“include an individual’s common law rights in property and 
bodily integrity, as well as in enforcing contracts.”97 
Nevertheless, “private rights may generally be distinguished by 
private law’s focus on individual compensation (or the 
avoidance of private loss by injunctive remedies).”98 Steven 
Winter, supported by Professor Sunstein, has concluded that 
American courts initially allowed a private person “‘who had no 
personal interest or injury-in-fact’ to initiate and conduct 
mandamus actions on behalf of the public at large.”99 In today’s 
America there should be very little doubt that allowing any 
Mississippian to challenge the state’s display of a Confederate 
symbol in its flag supports the greater community’s 
constitutional interest of eliminating state-sponsored 
endorsement of racial discrimination. 
 
B. A Private Injury-in-Fact Requirement is Not Needed to 
Guarantee the Separation of Powers Under Article III 
 
The failure to include a private injury-in-fact 
requirement for more than a hundred years following the 
Constitution’s ratification is very strong evidence that the 
personal injury-in-fact mandate is unnecessary to implement 
 
 94.  Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 85, at 693 et seq. 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 708. See supra note 94 (quoting Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing 
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1377 (1988)). 
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federal judicial power.100 If injury-in-fact were truly necessary 
to guarantee the separation of powers between the three 
branches of the federal government, the Court would have 
embraced the injury-in-fact mandate prior to 1970.101 Similarly, 
if the injury-in-fact mandate were essential, the Court would 
have developed a dependable and uniform rationale for it.102 
The Court requirement of injury-in-fact should be rejected 
because, with a flag that conveys sympathy for the goals of 
white supremacy, “the function of courts is to provide relief to 
those who have suffered a legally cognizable injury.”103 This 
should also apply to harm from state-sponsored symbolic 
governmental speech. “So, why does 
current standing doctrine require injury-in-fact? The most 
likely reason is that it is firmly entrenched in the law.”104 
Cass R. Sunstein correctly explained that the “injury-in-
fact” test is both relatively new and also represents a revisionist 
interpretation of Article III.105 Although the injury-in-fact 
requirement does not have any textual or historical backing, the 
Court recognized injury-in-fact as a constitutional 
requirement.106 Sunstein appropriately contends that the 
concept of “injury in fact is heavily dependent on an assessment 
of law instead of being a law-free inquiry into facts.”107 More 
fundamentally, a basic belief in an “injury-in-fact” theory is 
more than a misinterpretation of Article III, because it 
additionally represents a considerable conceptual error.108 The 
judicial treatment of standing as a constitutional law issue is an 
extremely modern occurrence, since no court utilized the 
 
 100.  Hessick, supra note 29, at 299. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 300. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Sunstein, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 167. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
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expression “injury-in-fact” prior to 1970.109 There is simply no 
favorable evidence mandating an “injury-in-fact” other than the 
basic requirement that an identifiable legal theory grants a 
plaintiff a cause of action.110 Since the personal injury-in-fact 
test lacks an identifiable constitutional source, it appears that 
the Supreme Court invented the ‘injury-in-fact’ concept.111 The 
author, a native Mississippian, contends federal courts should 
not deny plaintiffs like Moore an opportunity to prove on the 
merits that Mississippi’s flag violates the equal protection of the 
law concept under a made-up Article III personal injury-in-fact 
standing requirement.112 
 
IV. THE CONFEDERATE FLAG WHEN INCORPORATED IN 
A STATE FLAG IS RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH PROHIBITED UNDER AN 
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
 
Carlos Moore, an African-American attorney and a 
citizen of Mississippi, is the plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging 
Mississippi’s display of its state flag.113 Moore asserts that 
Mississippi’s state flag, which incorporates the Confederate 
flag, is race-based, harmful government speech prohibited by 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114 
Although the First Amendment does not prohibit 
the government from speaking,115 the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the government from intentionally conveying a 
 
 109.  Id. at 169 (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)). 
 110.  Id. at 178. 
 111.  Id. at 185. 
 112.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
 113.  Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 837 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 1195, 1198 
(2016). 
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message that creates a strong inference of support for racial 
discrimination and subordination.116 The state of 
Mississippi could easily function with a race-neutral state flag if 
denied the ability to promote a message of racial segregation in 
its flag. Because the Mississippi flag is a form of government 
speech that opposes racial equality, it injures the general public, 
and any Mississippian should be able to file a constitutional 
claim against the state. Professor Alexander Tsesis properly 
recognized the progressive position taken by Helen 
Norton that government speech promoting racial discriminatio
n   may violate Equal Protection principles.117 
 
A. The Government Speech Doctrine Does Not Allow a State 
to Sponsor a Flag with a Governmental Message of White 
Supremacy 
 
Even if the First Amendment does not restrain 
the government’s expression, the equal protection prohibition 
on racially discriminatory purposes should apply to a state flag 
with a Confederate symbol that virtually says on its face that it 
is racially discriminatory.118 It should not be controversial to 
prohibit the government from speaking in a manner that 
welcomes racial discrimination and racial intolerance. When a 
state government displays a flag that incorporates a 
Confederate symbol, it is engaging in prohibited government 
speech, because it is sending a message of support for racial 
discrimination that is inconsistent with the principle of equal 
protection. Because the Court has not clearly stated what 
speech represents government speech, the cases addressing the 
 
 116.  Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 117.  Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1145, 1178 n.180 (2013) (citing Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications 
of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 163 (2012)). 
 118.  Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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government speech theory are often inconsistent.119 
Nevertheless, the Court implies that the government speech 
doctrine is associated with a situation where it is obvious the 
government is endorsing private speech.120 One example of this 
can be seen when school officials place limits on expressive 
speech in public schools that members of the public might 
reasonably believe has the approval and support of the school.121 
It is my position that, under an Equal Protection Clause 
analysis, the government speech doctrine requires the judiciary 
to find that the presence of a Confederate symbol in the 
Mississippi flag is unconstitutional. This is because a reasonable 
observer would likely view a state flag incorporating a 
Confederate symbol in the courtroom or public square as 
expressive speech supporting white supremacy with the 
approval and support of the state of Mississippi. Therefore, 
displaying the Mississippi state flag inherently violates the 
principle of equal protection. The Court categorized some 
controversies before it as involving government speech.122 
Under the government speech doctrine, “when the government 
speaks, individuals and groups cannot use the Free Speech 
Clause to challenge a government message that conflicts with 
private viewpoints.”123 In effect, the government speech 
doctrine allows the government to engage in its own speech to 
end any private speech that the government concludes is 
objectionable.124 
The Court appropriately warned that the government 
speech doctrine is subject to constitutional constraints.125 For 
 
 119.  Papandrea, supra note 115, at 1199. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, When Government Speaks: An Examination of the 
Evolving Government Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. REP. 753, 754 (Feb. 16, 2012). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 759. 
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example, the Court specifically identified the constraints of the 
Establishment Clause, while strongly suggesting laws and 
regulations that place restrictions on advocacy of public officials 
are outside the scope of the government speech doctrine.126 In 
my view, a government entity engaging in government speech 
may be liable under the Equal Protection Clause for creating a 
state flag that incorporates a Confederate symbol representing 
a continued adherence to racial segregation. I believe a 
governmental entity should be held liable under the Equal 
Protection Clause for express advocacy of Confederate symbols 
that are closely linked to the support of intentional racial 
discrimination. If the Equal Protection Clause means anything 
it should prohibit Mississippi from promoting a flag that 
includes the Confederate battle emblem in the top left corner 
because such a flag is unacceptable government speech that 
endorses the unequal protection of the law.127 One 
commentator correctly observed how “the Equal Protection 
Clause has become a primary tool wielded by litigants and 
jurists to reshape American society.”128 Now is an appropriate 
time for courts to reshape their thinking about how the 
Mississippi flag, which is tainted by an incorporated 
Confederate symbol of racial insubordination, clearly injures a 
plaintiff under the equal protection principle, and conclude that 
the government speech doctrine is not a bar. 
Mississippi’s use of a Confederate symbol in its state flag 
creates a situation that undermines the equal protection 
principle because the state flag is government speech that 
conflicts with the Carolene Court’s expanding of effective 
political process expression for racial minorities.129 
 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
 128.  Brian R. Markley, Constitutional Provisions in Conflict: Article III Standing and 
Equal Protection After Shaw v. Reno, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 449, 449 (1995). 
 129.  U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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The Carolene Court outlined its new vision of political process 
expression for racial minorities in extremely expansive terms.130 
The Court refused to constrain its future intervention to easy 
incidents where African Americans or another oppressed people 
were rejected at the polls and generally not allowed to 
effectively engage in the fundamental rights of political 
expression.131 Carolene recommended a role for the judiciary 
that would remain robust even if every adult American had 
exercised his or her right to be involved in politics.   
 The Carolene footnote four rationale supports the argument 
that in a hypothetical world where African Americans voted at 
the same proportionality rates as whites, and where election 
districts accurately followed the Court’s reapportionment 
decisions, African Americans would nonetheless hold, as a 
result of their discreteness and insularity, a disproportionately 
underrepresented amount of power in shaping legislative 
policy—an inequality great enough to justify a judicial decision 
that a nondiscriminatory democratic process would produce 
results analytically to advance the concerns of African 
Americans and other disliked minorities.132 
The Mississippi flag, with its incorporated Confederate 
flag symbol, is unconstitutional government speech. In the real 
world because of their discreteness and insularity, racial 
minorities in Mississippi do not possess enough political power 
to successfully challenge Mississippi’s endorsement of the 
Confederate flag without judicial intervention.133 It is 
constitutionally correct to assert that the Mississippi flag with 
its incorporated Confederate symbol is government speech 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.134 However, this constitutionally correct 
 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). 
 132.  Id. at 715–16. 
 133.  Id. at 716. 
 134.  Robert J. Bein, Stained Flags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON 
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declaration that state sponsorship of a Confederate symbol, 
specifically the Confederate flag, violates the right to equal 
protection should not remain abstract academic theory.135 
Federal courts must now recognize that Mississippi’s 
incorporation of a Confederate symbol in its state flag creates 
an unacceptable race-based government speech that is the 
proximate cause of a public injury-in-fact to racial minorities. 
Although the government’s racially discriminatory 
speech may be consistent with free speech values, this does not 
suggest that the message is tolerable, because the Equal 
Protection Clause serves separate goals.136 The main objective 
of the Free Speech Clause is to promote democratic self-
governance by accommodating a marketplace of both political 
and non-political ideas.137 The state is most likely to sponsor 
racially discriminatory symbolic speech when the expression of 
approval for Confederate symbols and racial segregation is 
politically popular with majority of its constituency.138 Thus, 
“hateful government expression often targets unpopular 
minorities in situations when ordinary political accountability 
measures would provide no meaningful remedy, thus increasing 
the importance of identifying some means of constitutional 
redress.”139 Unlike the Free Speech Clause, the primary goal 
of the Equal Protection Clause is to overcome barriers to full 
equality that are based on racial and other status.140 “Hateful 
government speech that reinforces traditional patterns of 
hierarchy by communicating a message of exclusion or 
 
HALL L. REV. 897, 900 (1998). 
 135.  Id. at 901. 
 136. Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 169 (2012). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 170. 
 139.  Id. (citing Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Putting Down: Expressive Subordination and Equal 
Protection, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 112, 115 (2012)).  
 140.  Id. at 170–71. 
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inferiority based on class status thus offends an anti-
subordination view of the Equal Protection Clause.”141 
Moore argues that the Confederate flag, as incorporated 
in the Mississippi flag, is an unconstitutional symbolic 
government speech supporting illegal race-based subordination, 
and can be reasonably understood to violate the Fourteen 
Amendment’s anti-subordination equal protection rationale.142 
The federal district court denied Moore an opportunity to 
show that the Mississippi state flag, with an incorporated 
Confederate symbol, is unconstitutional when the court 
decided he lacked standing to oppose the flag because he did 
not suffer a personal injury-in-fact.143 The conventional case or 
controversy mandate of Article III limits the judiciary to 
accepting only those cases that can be traditionally resolved by 
the judicial process.144 A significant doctrine the Court has 
utilized to protect habitual restraint on the judicial process is 
standing.145 
James Coleman sued to stop the flying of the Georgia 
state flag above Georgia’s state operated workplaces.146 
Coleman, an African American, understood that such a display 
of the Georgia flag, which at the time included the Confederate 
battle flag symbol, was government speech that infringed upon 
his collective right to the equal protection of the law.147 Because 
Southern history matters, the court in Miller had judicial notice 
that flying the Georgia flag with an incorporated Confederate 
symbol had disproportionate effects along racial lines; 
therefore, Coleman’s equal protection claim should have been 
 
 141.  Id. at 171. 
 142.  Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Hessick, supra note 29, at 276. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 527 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 147.  See id. 
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accepted and not rejected.148 An African American plaintiff 
should not be required to show obvious disproportionate 
impact by means of racial lines by producing specific factual 
evidence to demonstrate that a state flag that includes a 
Confederate symbol, in this case the Confederate flag, inflicts a 
considerable subordination burden upon African Americans as a 
group that is not experienced by whites. The disproportionate 
impact of racial subordination is a self-evident proposition 
because state sponsorship of the Confederate flag is plainly 
understood as government speech inviting and encouraging 
racial discrimination by whites.149 
The Confederate battle flag symbolizes a governmental 
philosophy dedicated to preserving a divisive society where only 
whites were entitled to liberty and equality.150 “The continued 
glorification of Confederate symbols in official venues around 
the country, and especially in the South, reflects an 
unwillingness to abide by the full scope of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which bans all badges of servitude.”151 A current 
exhibition of the Confederate battle flag by a state government 
in a glorified place above state owned buildings and on official 
state logos is an ugly reminder that, while slavery is no longer 
legal in America, “some of its vestiges linger in American 
culture.”152 “Governmental incorporation of Confederate 
symbols . . . encourages the uninhibited expression of racism 
through unfair hiring practices and hate crimes.”153 
The Eleventh Circuit all but conceded that the Georgia 
State flag, which included the Confederate flag symbol, 
represented government speech with a racially discriminatory 
 
 148.  Contra id. at 529–30. 
 149.  Contra id. at 530. 
 150.  Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 543 (2002). 
 151.  Id. at 558–59. 
 152.  Id. at 559. 
 153.  Id. at 556. 
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purpose because the state flag was approved as part of Georgia’s 
public leaders’ crusade to reject the Supreme Court’s school 
desegregation decisions.154 In 1956, Georgia’s Governor 
Marvin Griffin said, “there will be no mixing of the races in 
public schools, in college classrooms in Georgia as long as I am 
Governor.”155 Anti-desegregation public officials in Georgia 
raised and resurrected the Confederate battle flag as expressive 
governmental speech to demonstrate their disdain for even the 
thought of integrated public schools. Those who lost the Civil 
War and the battle to preserve a separate but unequal society 
based on race have used the Confederate flag as government 
speech symbolizing resistance to both racial integration and 
racial equality. It is reasonable to declare Southern resistance to 
racial integration, including celebrating Confederate war 
symbols, as government speech. The message: Blacks’ fight for 
freedom and justice was a lost cause because the white South 
would rise again to overcome racial justice. 
The Article III standing requirement allows a person the 
right to challenge a state’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag 
as a racially biased symbol that causes constitutional injury to 
those who oppose race-based subordination.156 Since the 
Confederate flag incorporated in Mississippi’s flag endorses 
pervasive racial discrimination, the lower federal courts should 
appropriately abandon conventional standing principles to cure 
a state’s equal protection violation.157 When a state flag 
incorporates the Confederate flag into its official or de facto 
state flag, it endorses the discredited separate but equal 
 
 154.  Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d at 528 n.3 (“In 1954, the Supreme Court declared 
racially segregated public schools unconstitutional, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (‘Brown I ’), and, a year later, the Court ordered that the desegregation of public schools 
proceed ‘with all deliberate speed.’ Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (‘Brown 
II’)”). 
 155.  Id. at 528. 
 156.  Markley, supra note 128, at 452. 
 157.  Id. 
WEEDEN.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:46 PM 
117] Confederate Symbols 
143 
principle.158 “Racist symbols, placed conspicuously in public 
places, have the effect of bolstering persons resolved to act on 
racist ideology.”159 As a matter of fact specific “[h]ate groups 
that have incorporated the same Confederate symbols into 
logos, such as the KKK and Aryan Nation, are keenly aware 
that they are joined by some state governments in lauding 
the Confederate cause and its heroes.”160 In Coleman v. Miller, 
the court explicitly implemented the historical-ly wrongheaded 
personal injury-in-fact standing theory to justify its conclusion 
that a state’s intentional racially discriminatory endorsement of 
the Confederate flag is not a violation of the equal protection 
principle.161 Intentional discrimination against a racial group 
that cannot be corrected by the political process should be 
acknowledged as a public injury-in-fact under an anti-
subordination political process rationale.162 
A proper, historically correct understanding of the 
standing doctrine and the equal protection principle supports 
the conclusion that Mississippi is prohibited from endorsing the 
pre-Civil War concept of separate but equal established in 
Roberts v. City of Boston.163 After the Civil War and the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States nevertheless 
approved the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.164 Any plausible reading of Plessy leads to the 
unavoidable conclusion that the Supreme Court gave its 
approval to state-sponsored racial discrimination against 
African Americans in spite of the language in the Equal 
 
 158.  See Tsesis, supra note 150, at 558. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Coleman v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ga. 1996). 
 162.  Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 163.  Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). See also Sunstein, supra 
note 25, at 167. 
 164.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
WEEDEN. MACRO.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:46 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 32 
144 
Protection Clause, which clearly appears to prohibit racial 
discrimination against blacks and others who are not white.165 
The discredited separate but equal doctrine, when endorsed by 
the state sponsorship of a Confederate flag, may reasonably be 
viewed as a state granting the racially insensitive a license to 
engage in racial discrimination.  
An objective observer could reasonably regard 
Mississippi’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag as symbolic 
government speech perpetuating illegitimate sympathy for Jim 
Crow racial discrimination. Mississippi should not be 
permitted, by incorporating the Confederate flag into its state 
flag, to encourage the racial separation of people or to burden 
people with a race-based Confederate flag that symbolizes the 
perceived racial inferiority of African Americans.166 Mississippi 
should not be allowed to engage in government speech that 
promotes a perception of racial inferiority for nonwhites.167 
Conversely, this perception of racial inferiority of nonwhites 
and its connection to Mississippi’s government speech 
endorsing a race-based Confederate flag is very likely to 
perpetuate a feeling of racial superiority in the minds and hearts 
of unthinking whites in a manner unlikely to end anytime 
soon.168 Unfortunately, Moore v. Bryant joins the courts that 
have not recognized that standing rules without the personal 
injury-in-fact requirement allow an equal protection objection 
to a state’s endorsement of the Confederate flag.169 A 
misapplication of the standing doctrine occurs when a court 
fails to recognize that the Confederate flag, when incorporated 
into the Mississippi flag, should be treated as a virtual Jim Crow 
racial classification.170 Symbolic racial classifications supporting 
 
 165.  Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 166.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  See id. 
 169.  Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
 170.  See Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
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Jim Crow Confederate symbols, when endorsed by Mississippi, 
produce a concrete public injury.171 
 
B. Mississippi’s Flag Represents a Racially Tainted Political 
Process that Produces Racially Tainted Government Speech 
 
Mississippi’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag should 
also be treated as a tainted state political process issue inspired 
by Jim Crow policies that racial minorities have not been able 
to correct.172 Mississippi’s endorsement of the Confederate flag 
as its official flag is constitutionally suspect government speech 
because the state’s white majority continues to burden its black 
minority with a racially insensitive Jim Crow flag.173 Since 
African Americans are unable to use a tainted political process 
to remove the Confederate flag symbol as government speech, 
the political process rationale requires judicial intervention to 
prevent Mississippi from using its flag as a daily reminder of 
racial subordination.174 In February 2001, the Mississippi 
legislature scheduled a special election for April 17, 2001, and 
voters decided to keep the current flag with its Confederate 
symbol and rejected a replacement design without the 
Confederate symbol.175 “The special election results 
substantially favored the 1894 flag, with 65% voting to keep it 
and 35% favoring the alternate design. It once again was the 
State’s official banner.”176 
The rationale of footnote four in United States v. 
Carolene Products applies to the Mississippi flag because the 
state display of the flag is not entitled to the presumption of 
 
Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 816 (2008). 
 171.  See id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See id. 
 174.  See id. 
 175.  Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 846 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
 176.  Id. 
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constitutionality. The Mississippi flag, as symbolic government 
speech, virtually appears on its face to be within the specific 
prohibition of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.177 
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from 
engaging in government speech that promotes a message of a 
superior race.178 Courts must acknowledge that the white voting 
majority in Mississippi and blind loyalty to a false Southern 
heritage disable the political process. Mississippi’s tainted 
political process cannot effect a repeal of the display of a 
racially subordinating Confederate government speech symbol 
in the state flag. Mississippi’s incorporation of the Confederate 
flag symbol in its flag is so inherently suspect that the state 
should be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.179 
A legitimate Southern heritage would not hide behind a 
Confederate flag government speech symbol representing a 
white supremacy state of mind. The real Southern heritage 
acknowledges its entire Southern people regardless of race. For 
example, the author is very happy to be black and a real 
Southerner. True Southerners know that all lives matter, and 
false Southerners are all too quick to forget all lives matter, 
including black lives. If it is true that in the South all lives 
matter equally, then a Confederate flag representing 
government speech promoting racial discrimination against 
people because the color of their skin represents an offense to 
true Southern fundamental fairness. Without fundamental 
fairness to everyone in the South, Southern hospitality is a 
mere myth. 
The expressive governmental speech symbol of the 
Confederate flag inside the Mississippi flag intentionally directs 
its racial prejudice against discrete and insular racial 
 
 177.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 178.  See id. 
 179.  See id. 
WEEDEN.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:46 PM 
117] Confederate Symbols 
147 
minorities.180 The racial subordination represented by the 
Mississippi flag cannot be corrected by a tainted political 
process that abandons minorities rather than protecting 
them.181 When a state’s political process fails to protect racial 
minorities from a state flag representing racial discrimination, a 
more searching judicial inquiry, now known as strict scrutiny, is 
needed.182 Strict scrutiny is needed because Mississippi’s flag 
represents racially divisive governmental speech that violates 
equal protection. Mississippi could acknowledge an inclusive, 
truly race neutral Southern heritage in its flag with a race 
neutral magnolia, a Southern symbol. When a state engages in 
government speech by supporting the Confederate flag symbol, 
it communicates an illegitimate message that incites sympathy 
for racial inequality in violation of equal protection of the law. 
Regardless of the degree of psychological knowledge available 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, courts now should 
recognize that a government speech message of racial 
inferiority conveyed about African Americans creates a public-
place, psychological group injury to the members of the 
stigmatized group.183 Any unreasonable reading of Plessy v. 
Ferguson supporting a finding of no concrete public harm 
under a false standing doctrine should be rejected.184 Because 
the Confederate flag symbol as government speech is so closely 
connected to the doctrine of “separate but equal,” it has no 
place in the Mississippi state flag.185 If racially separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal, then it stands to 
reason that a Confederate flag representing the government 
speech of white supremacy in Mississippi also inherently 
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 183.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 184.  Id. at 494–95. 
 185.  Id. at 495. 
WEEDEN. MACRO.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:46 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 32 
148 
deprives an African American plaintiff “the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”186 
Government speech endorsing the Confederate flag 
plays the race card without any legitimate reason. If the 
constitutional theory of “equal protection of the laws” has any 
significance at all, it is clear that, even under its simplest 
application, it has to signify that a state-sponsored plan to send 
messages of racial subordination to “a politically unpopular 
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,”187 
even if the message is only expressed by government speech. In 
1970, the adoption of the Confederate flag at Southside High 
School in Muncie, Indiana, was unsuccessfully challenged as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.188 The school’s 
conduct could easily have been seen by a reasonable person as 
government speech by a school endorsing the lost cause of 
white supremacy. After Southside opened in 1962, the students 
were permitted under established school board policy to adopt 
the Confederate flag as the school flag and designate the 
school’s athletic teams the Rebels.189 In a 1968 report entitled 
“Student Friction and Racial Unrest at Southside High School, 
Muncie, Indiana” to the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, the Indiana State Advisory Committee recommended 
that the school stop using the Confederate flag at Southside 
High School without delay because “it is [virtually] impossible 
for [African American] students to feel loyal to a school whose 
official symbols represent a system that enslaved their 
ancestors.”190 
The conclusion that the Southside High plaintiffs made 
no showing of racial or political discrimination should be 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 188.  Banks v. Muncie Cmty. Sch., 433 F.2d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
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rejected because of the school intentionally adopted a separate 
but equal Confederate flag symbol, which a reasonable observer 
is substantially certain to perceive as government speech 
endorsing racial discrimination and white supremacy.191 A 
school board policy that approved the use of a Confederate flag, 
which constituted “measurable” racially subordinating 
government speech, at Southside High [was] racially neutral in 
name only.192 Since the racially subordinating Confederate flag 
is substantially certain to be viewed as racially discriminatory 
government speech, a state-sponsored display of the flag should 
be considered an act of intentional racial discrimination.193 An 
intentional school board policy that permits students to use a 
Confederate flag as a school symbol is government speech that 
should be treated the same as a policy that contains a racial 
classification on its face because of the flag’s connection to 
slavery and subordination.194 No inquiry into legislative policy 
is needed because the racially discriminatory nature of the 
Confederate flag, as government speech supporting 
subordination, is self-evident.195 
 
V. MISSISSIPPI’S PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES ARE PLAUSIBLE 
SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFFS TO CHALLENGE THE 
STATE’S SPONSORSHIP OF A CONFEDERATE SYMBOL 
IN ITS OFFICIAL FLAG 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s statement in Washington v. 
Trump196 that Washington and Minnesota had standing to 
assert their own rights and rights of third parties may help to 
 
 191.  Contra id. 
 192.  Bein, supra note 134, at 917. 
 193.  Id. at 917–18. 
 194.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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identify potential successful plaintiffs to challenge Mississippi’s 
sponsorship of a Confederate symbol. On January 27, 2017, 
President Trump issued Executive Order 13769 entitled 
“Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the 
United States.”197 After referring to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the Executive Order declared, “numerous 
foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in 
terrorism-related crimes.”198 The Executive Order proclaims 
“the United States must ensure that those admitted to this 
country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding 
principles.”199 The power of the Executive Order was instant 
and extensive.200 “It was reported that thousands of visas were 
immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas 
were prevented from boarding airplanes bound for the United 
States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers were 
detained.”201 
Washington alleged that the Executive Order, among other 
things, unconstitutionally damaged the State’s economy and 
public universities in violation of the Fifth Amendment.202 
Particularly relevant for the purposes of my analysis, schools 
have been permitted to assert the rights of their students.203 
Since the interests of the States’ universities are aligned with 
their students for purposes of conventional Article III 
standing,204 Mississippi universities may be the plaintiffs’ best-
positioned to establish standing to challenge the Mississippi flag 
with its Confederate symbol. “The students’ educational 
success is ‘inextricably bound up’ in the universities’ capacity to 
 
 197.  Id. at 1156 (citing 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017)). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 1157. 
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 202.  Id. at 1159–60. 
 203.  Id. at 1160. 
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teach them . . . [a]nd the universities’ reputations depend on the 
success of their professors’ research.”205 
By analogy, a Mississippi university may assert not only 
its own rights (to the extent that the university is harmed by the 
Mississippi flag’s incorporation of a Confederate symbol of 
racial subordination), but the state university may also assert 
the right of its students and faculty to a competitive educational 
experience. If the facts demonstrate that a disproportionate 
number of well-regarded professors refuse to come to a 
Mississippi university to teach or conduct research because of 
Mississippi’s official flag, the university’s students and faculty 
have suffered an injury-in-fact. Once a Mississippi university 
demonstrates its students have suffered an injury-in-fact 
because of the loss of an opportunity to recruit a competitive 
faculty, the third party standing rules allow the affected 
Mississippi university to sue the State of Mississippi on behalf 
of its students to remove the official flag of racial 
subordination.206 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Confederate symbols are currently impacting American 
and Southern life207 although they essentially vanished into the 
wind once the Civil War ended.208 White Southerners returned 
to Confederate symbols to demonstrate their resistance to the 
Civil Rights movement.209 A longing to continue the practice of 
racial segregation and racial discrimination against African 
Americans in 
the United States inspired the reappearance of Confederate sy
 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Strother et al., supra note 1. 
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m-bols.210 In 1948, the Confederate flag developed into a 
powerful political symbol of white support for racial 
segregation during the Dixiecrat revolt after Strom Thurmond 
organized a demonstration by white Southerners at the 
Democratic National Convention to picket against President 
Harry S. Truman’s endorsement of civil rights.211 Many others 
followed the practice begun by the Dixiecrats of waving the 
Confederate flag to challenge any movement toward racial 
equality.212 After the show the Dixiecrats put on at the 
Democratic convention in 1948, the Confederate flag 
represented white supremacy and a rejection of equal rights for 
African Americans because of their race.213 
A real issue, not appropriately addressed in any of the 
opinions challenging the state sponsorship of a Confederate 
flag symbol in its official flag, implicates the correct description 
of the injury.214 To understand the point, it may be necessary to 
remember the standing problem before the Court in Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke.215 Bakke could not 
demonstrate that but for the affirmative action plan he 
opposed, he would have been accepted into the medical school 
of the University of California at Davis.216 A plausible argument 
was made that Bakke would not qualify for standing under the 
Article III requirement of injury-in-fact.217  
According to Sunstein, the Court addressed the standing 
issue in Bakke in a manner that, in theory, has allowed it to find 
injury-in-fact without technically abandoning its conventional 
approach to standing.218 “What happened here was that 
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the Bakke Court found injury, causation, and redressability by 
the simple doctrinal device of recharacterizing the injury.”219 
“In Bakke, the Court described the injury as involving not 
admission to medical school but the [lack of] opportunity to 
compete on equal terms.”220 Similarly, in Allen v. Wright,221 the 
Court could “have recharacterized the injury as an opportunity 
not to have the desegregation process distorted by the 
incentives created through the grant of unlawful tax deductions 
to private schools.”222 The contextual racial subordination of 
minorities occurs when a state sponsors a Confederate symbol 
in its official flag. The courts should recharacterize the plaintiff 
injury challenging Mississippi’s flag as an opportunity not to 
have the concept of the equal protection of the law distorted by 
the racially tainted government speech endorsing the 
discredited separate but equal doctrine.223 
In sum, the contemporary standing law and personal injury-
in-fact requirement represents a revisionist interpretation of 
Article III that is not actually mandated under Article III. I have 
taken the position that the judges in the Confederate flag cases, 
who have blindly followed the private injury-in-fact 
requirement of standing, have denied deserving plaintiffs who 
are descendants of slaves relief from state-sponsored speech in 
the form of Confederate symbols that send a message of white 
supremacy. Accordingly, federal courts should recognize that 
any individual living in Mississippi has a right to challenge 
Mississippi’s usage of a state flag with a Confederate symbol, 
which violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
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